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Abstract This discussion note does three things: (1) it
explains the notion of ‘legal protection by design’ in
relation to data-driven infrastructures that form the back-
bone of our new ‘onlife world’, (2) it explains how the
notion of ‘by design’ relates to the relational nature of
what an environment affords its inhabitants, referring to
the work of James Gibson, and (3) it explains how this
affects our understanding of human capabilities in relation
to the affordances of changing environments. Finally, this
brief note argues that ‘safer by design’ in the case of
nanotechnology will require legal protection by design
to make sure that human capabilities are reinvented and
sustained in nano-technical environments.
Keywords Legal protection by design . Affordance .
Capability . Data-driven architectures . Rule of Law.
Natural language . Computational infrastructures
Introduction
This brief discussion note enquires into ‘legal protection by
design’ (LPbD), an idea that is similar to but not identical
with the subject of this special issue: ‘safer by design’.
LPbD emerged on the cusp of data science and law, raising
the pivotal question of whether we can be saved by design
when written law fails to save us from the pitfalls of data-
driven architectures. Since this question is also relevant for
the notion of ‘safer by design’ in the case of nanotechnol-
ogy, I share my thoughts on the issue. Before introducing
LPbD, let me first clarify that I will refer to ‘design’ as the
process of developing and engineering specific technolo-
gies, as well as the process of introducing and employing
them in human society (design as a verb), including also
the result of that process (design as a noun). Design should
not be understood as merely a matter of shaping the
interface; it also concerns the back end of technological
systems and the way they frame interactions on the front
end. Second, ‘by design’ is not a panacea. Rather, it may
be a precondition that enables safe, fair, accountable and
transparent research and employment of data-driven archi-
tectures, nanotechnology and other new technologies.
Whether we manage to achieve such laudable ends will
depend on other factors, but if we neglect ‘safer by design’
as a first principle, we are in for trouble. Third, to instigate
‘safer by design’, we will need more than ethics. I will
therefore conclude that ‘safer by design’will be dependent
on LPbD for its success as a precondition, as this turns
‘safer by design’ into a legal obligation for all those
involved in researching, developing, marketing and pro-
viding products involving nanotechnology.
The Need for Legal Protection byDesign in the onlife
World
The idea of LPbD has arisen from the mutation of law’s
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computation when it comes to the framing of reality.
Today, much of the framing is done or prepared by data-
driven machines that feed on our behavioural data. Au
fond, these machines present humans with a choice
architecture that is based on automated AB testing and
predictive or even pre-emptive machine learning con-
traptions. To describe the life world that is produced by
the combination of big data, learning algorithms and
myriad cyber-physical infrastructures, some have pro-
posed to use the notion of an onlife world [1]. This refers
to the transformation of offline environments into online
realms, exemplified by the Internet of things, self-
driving cars, smart energy grids and other cyber-
physical infrastructures. The onlife world also refers to
the fact that the combination of computational back end
systems, hyperconnectivity and machine learning basi-
cally turns our inorganic environment into an animated
world, ‘populated’ bymindless interactingmachines that
anticipate our behaviours and act upon the predictions
they generate. The latter implies that these architectures
do not merely turn everything online; due to machine
learning and machine agency, things also—seemingly—
come alive. Even though they have no consciousness,
let alone self-consciousness, they foresee us and
act on that. Finally, the notion of an onlife world sug-
gests that the online realm has penetrated our life world;
it has become our new ‘everyday’, the air we breathe. It
informs how we experience our own life.
My assumption here is that the choice architecture of
everyday life is increasingly designed or engineered
instead of given, constructed by complex computational
systems upon which we become ever more dependent.
This implies that central tenets of the law, such as
individual consent, freedom of information, fairness
and legal certainty can no longer be taken for granted.
The ‘existence’ of these legal tenets has been dependent
upon the decisions of legislators and courts that produce
legal code and case law, both of which attribute legal
effect if specific legal conditions apply. Such decisions
and the ensuing legal effect have thus been contingent
upon what is afforded by the technologies of the word,
[2] notably the print-wise multiplication of natural lan-
guage text. The shift from natural language to compu-
tation as the most influential means to frame reality
implies—as I have argued elsewhere—that the mode
of existence of law-as-we-know-it is on the verge of
changing beyond recognition [3, 4]. If the law is meant
to regulate a world generated by computational systems,
it must learn to speak the language of computation. The
need for LPbD is not, therefore, based on the desire to
enforce legal compliance (as with ‘legal by design’,
‘computational law’ or ‘techno-regulation’), [5] but—
on the contrary—based on the awareness that current
technological ecosystems are disrupting the meaning
and the substance of legal effect and the force of law
[6],1 notably in the realm of the protection of fundamen-
tal rights.
Computing systems, by now, mould the choice ar-
chitecture of human interaction to an extent that uproots
previous ways of ordering that were based on what
sociologists like to call ‘institutions’. The sociological
notion of an institution refers to consolidated patterns of
human interaction shaped by mutual expectations. The
ensuing web of anticipations that informs interacting
individuals grounds institutions such as marriage, em-
ployment, religious worship, the market and education.
This grounding is accomplished by means of natural
language. Ηuman language facilitates shared meaning
and ‘common sense’, as well as the ability to disrupt
such meaning by means of creative resistance or simply
by generating successful misunderstandings that—in
turn—lead to subtle or not so subtle shifts in meaning.2
Institutions create stability in the face of these iterant
shifts in meaning that in turn feed on the inherent
ambiguity of the human language. This ambiguity is
both unsettling and productive, creating both uncertain-
ty and possibility. Computing systems, however, speak
another language, whether they are deterministic (as
with block-chain) or somewhat unpredictable (as with
machine learning). Nevertheless, just like institutions
used to do, networked computer systems often deter-
mine the options for their end-users, while hiding the
myriad operations in their so-called backend, to provide
a smooth user experience or to nudge end-users in the
direction that fits whoever developed (or paid for) the
system. Whereas the ambiguity of natural language
enables the contestation of received opinion as well as
expert evidence, precisely because it builds on a seman-
tics that is always on the move, this is not evident in the
case of computer language. The latter requires unam-
biguous instructions, even in the case of machine learn-
ing. Also, currently, most end-users have no way of
1 Mundane notions such as ‘compliance’ or ‘nudging’ should not be
confused with the force of lawwhich is situated on the cusp of the need
for legal certainty (the positivity of modern law) and the open texture of
natural language (enabling and requiring interpretation, hesitation and
argumentation).
2 On communication as a successful misunderstanding ([7] 28).
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understanding the rules that inform the systems they use
[8]. That is why we may need LPbD to safeguard (1) the
democratic legitimacy of our societal infrastructure and
(2) the contestability of its choice architecture.
LPbD, then, requires that the legal conditions we
have agreed upon (articulated in natural language) are
translated into the technical requirements that inform the
data-driven architecture of our everyday environment.
These requirements should instigate technical specifica-
tions and default settings that—other than current sys-
tems—afford the protection of fundamental rights.
Thus, LPbD should constrain the data-driven architec-
tures that run our new onlife world, while challenging
developers to offer multiple ways of modelling the
world, thus making their calculations, predictions and
pre-emptions both testable and contestable. Instead of
‘anything goes’ for the architects of this new world,
democratically legitimated law must regain its monop-
oly on setting the defaults of societal order, defining the
rules of the game in a way that brings the data-driven
machinery under the Rule of Law.
Saved by Design: Affordances and Capabilities
Though nanotechnology is not equivalent with the rise
of a data-driven environment, this discussion note may
nevertheless be pivotal for the idea of ‘safer by design’
when it comes to the reconstruction of our physical
environment, which nanotechnology enables. This re-
construction is potentially as disruptive as cyber-
physical architectures, therefore similarly requiring in-
terventions at the level of the design of nanotechnology.
To make the comparison more relevant and interesting, I
will probe the notion of ‘by design’ by taking the dual
perspectives of affordances and capabilities, based on
James Gibson’s and Amartya Sen’s work.
Gibson developed an ecological psychology that
highlights the interdependencies between an organism
and its environment [9]. He framed this in terms of what
an environment affords a specific organism, allowing it
to flourish in its cognitive niche. He highlights the
complementarity of the organism and its environment,
by speaking of what the environment offers the observ-
ing organism—which obviously depends on what it is
capable of perceiving and acting upon. An affordance
can be positive (enabling) or negative (constraining) and
is neither an objective fact (an affordance is agent-
dependent) nor subjective (an affordance is contingent
upon what the environment allows or constrains). It is
also neither physical nor psychical, but both; an
affordance is all about a perceiving and acting agent
and an environment that enables such enaction,3 which
is a matter of matter, structure, fitness and malleability:
‘an affordance points both ways, to the environment and
to the observer’ ([9] 129). The notion of a cognitive
niche was developed by others, underlining that inter-
actions between an agent and its environment depend on
the agent’s specific ability to cognize the environment,
while highlighting the transformations that may result
from the interaction, notably also the transformations of
environment [11]. A cognitive niche, therefore, is not
merely the contingent habitat of the agent, but a co-
creation of both the agent and its cognitive niche. Gib-
son’s point is not to remain stuck in affordances that are
easily perceived [12],4 but also to detect affordances that
operate below the radar, in the back end of our immedi-
ate surroundings, setting the stage for what shows up
frontstage. His relational and ecological understanding
of cognition provides key conceptual tools to describe
how affordances and their concomitant choice architec-
tures change whenever the environment changes. In
essence, the concept of an affordance contributes to
describing how such transformations change who and
what we are.
Sen developed an economic theory that moves be-
yond the opportunities to the capabilities that individ-
uals have, which depends not only on their environment
but also on the skills they develop to interact with the
opportunities the environment offers them [13]. He
framed capabilities in terms of our effective freedom to
choose a set of valuable ‘functionings’ (‘beings and
doings’), showing how a relational understanding of
individual well-being helps to move beyond standard
misconceptions of economic welfare. The latter tend to
define welfare in terms of access to commodities, miss-
ing out on whether an individual had the chance to
develop the skills to interact with such commodities in
ways that allow her to enjoy her version of the good life.
Let us now combine Gibson’s relational concept of
an affordance, which highlights that the affordances of
an environment are agent-dependent, with Sen’s rela-
tional concept of a capability, which highlights that
3 On the notion of enaction as the coupling of action and perception,
where perception singles out the action potential of the environment for
a specific organism, see [10].
4 Norman is focused on the visible or detectable affordances.
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capabilities depend onwhether an individual has learned
how to make the most of what the environment affords.
As should be clear, affordances and human capabilities
are two sides of the same coin. A proper understanding
of the dependencies between affordances (environment)
and capabilities (human agent) will allow us to figure
out how transformations in the technological landscape
will enhance or diminish the capabilities of those living
within its ambit, while this may also explain what it
would mean to ‘save human capabilities by design’.
One of Kranzberg’s famous ‘laws’ states that ‘tech-
nologies are neither good nor bad, but never neutral’
[14]. This finding is built on the insight that technolo-
gies enable, enforce, inhibit or preclude specific behav-
iour.5 In terms of Gibson, one could say that new tech-
nologies will have both positive and negative
affordances that, in terms of Sen, may transform human
capabilities, also depending on how humans learn to
interact with such technologies. The design, in the sense
of the way that specific technologies, such as nanotech-
nologies, are engineered, introduced and taken up in
human society, will make all the difference for the
affordances they offer. To the extent that nanotechnol-
ogies generate new affordances, their employment will
affect the capabilities of those that are forced, persuaded
or invited to interact with them, or even come to depend
on them. Often, the distribution of such affordances is
not equivalent across different groups and individuals,
depending on their ability to understand and act upon
these affordances. In that sense, architecture is indeed
politics [16, 17].Whether we are speaking of physical or
computational architectures, the constraints and en-
ablers that come with specific architectures determine
how knowledge, skills and power are distributed. They
may, on top of that, also determine whether people have
the possibility to change this distribution.
Finals
Synthetic biology, data-driven applications, 3D printing
and GMOs have new or even novel affordances. So
does nanotechnology. Though these affordances are
not necessarily moral or political in the narrow sense,
they may redistribute or annihilate private interests and
public goods such as physical safety and non-
discrimination (since risks and benefits are seldom dis-
tributed evenly across a population). In the case of
nanotechnology, the primary concern will be with safe-
ty, security and with uncertainty about unstable or un-
known affordances. This means that we, as a society, as
a democratic polity that owes equal respect and concern
to each individual citizen [18], must get our act together
and develop legal incentives similar to that of data
protection by design (which includes security by design)
for the development, marketing and employment of
products that involve nanotechnology. I would argue
that ‘safer by design’, however, is not a panacea and
will only be effective if its implementation is required by
law—attributing liability to those not interested in
investing in making their product and services safer by
design. In that sense, even ‘safer by design’ is in dire
need of ‘legal protection by design’, thus turning it from
an ethical choice into a legal requirement. This would
bring nanotechnology under the Rule of Law [19].6
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